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Abstract
The theoretical challenges for international relations (IR) posed by China’s
rise cannot be adequately addressed at a mere theoretical level.
Predicated on a Cartesian/Newtonian ontology that assumes a mechanis-
tic world made up of discrete, self-contained parts (e.g., sovereign nation-
states), mainstream IR theories offer limited understanding of China’s rise.
In this article, I propose an alternative, holographic relational ontology.
Drawing upon recent IR scholarship on relational ontology and holo-
graphic ideas in quantum physics as well as traditional Asian thoughts,
this ‘new’ ontology posits that the world exists fundamentally as holo-
graphic relations, in which a part is a microcosmic reflection of its larger
whole(s). As a part of various wholes in global politics, ‘China’ is thus
never an entity in and of itself, but holographic reflections of them. Its
rise is best understood as a phenomenon of holographic transition, in
which characteristics of those larger wholes are being enfolded into what
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is known as ‘China’. Thus, both the ‘China’ challenges and ‘China’ oppor-
tunities, rather than some inherently ‘Chinese’ properties, are products of
China’s holographic relations. This ontology has broader conceptual and
methodological as well as policy implications for IR in East Asia and
beyond.
. . . every entity, however fundamental it may seem, is dependent for its
existence on the maintenance of appropriate conditions in its infinite
background and substructure. The conditions in the background and
substructure, however, must themselves evidently be affected by their
mutual interconnections with the entities under consideration.
– David Bohm (Nichol, 2003, 24)
1 Introduction
The rise of China has posed a number of pressing questions: Can it rise
peacefully? What does it mean for global governance and the rules-
based liberal order? Will it seek regional or even global dominance?
And can it avoid the so-called Thucydides Trap? In the ongoing debate,
at one level is an inﬂuential perspective informed by realism, and partic-
ularly by offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2010) and power transi-
tion theory (Organski, 1961; Organski and Kugler, 1980). It argues that
the tragic consequences of previous power transitions, from the
Peloponnesian War to the two World Wars, do not bode well for
China’s rise in the 21st century (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lai, 2011).
A second perspective, following (neo)liberal institutionalism, social con-
structivism, and/or the English School, argues that China’s rise, taking
place in a liberal international order, is subject to socialization into in-
ternational society. As a result, there is a high probability of its peaceful
rise and status-quo orientation (Johnston, 2003; Zheng, 2005; Kang,
2007; Ikenberry, 2008; Johnston, 2008; Zhu, 2008; Buzan, 2010; Clark,
2014).
These, of course, are just two broad perspectives within an extremely
diverse and still-growing body of literature. At this juncture, one won-
ders what else can be added to the debate on China’s rise. To some,
the debate should now focus on more rigorous empirical testing of
existing competing perspectives (Kang, 2003/2004; Chen, 2012, 71).
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But to others, the rise of China precisely demands the search for a new
vocabulary (Kavalski, 2014) as well as the development of international
relations (IR) theories, particularly from Chinese perspectives (Zhao,
2009; Qin, 2009; Qin, 2010). While such empirical and theoretical em-
phases have merit, in this article I argue that we need to probe deeper
by rethinking the ontological foundation upon which the China debate
and indeed much of mainstream IR theorizing have been based.
The existing ontological foundation rests on a classical Cartesian/
Newtonian worldview, which has not only heavily shaped the develop-
ment of modern science, but also inﬂuenced the ways social scientists
understand human society. In the IR context, this ontology assumes
that the international system is made up of largely self-contained
(though possibly interdependent and/or potentially socializable) units
such as sovereign states, each possessing certain essential and distinc-
tive identity and occupying a more or less clearly demarcated territorial
space. With the China debate so far largely silent on the issue of ontol-
ogy (with the possible exception of Zhao Tingyang’s and Qin Yaqing’s
works, e.g., Zhao, 2006; Qin, 2009), China’s rise has been framed pri-
marily within this conventional ontological thinking.
Yet, the ‘rise of China’ provides both a good opportunity to ques-
tion this dominant ontological metanarrative and an empirical case for
exploring the promises of what I call a ‘holographic relational ontol-
ogy’. Building on but going further than the relational turn’s emphasis
on relations and relationality, the holographic relational ontology iden-
tiﬁes a particular type of relationality between parts and whole.
Drawing on the holographic principles in quantum physics that each
part contains information about the whole, this holographic ontology
in the IR context sees the world as a hologram in which each state is a
situated holographic microcosm of that world. This insight allows us
to see ‘China’ in a different yet more dynamic and less singular light.
The article proceeds in four parts. First, it will brieﬂy examine how
the Cartesian/Newtonian ontology has informed the IR discipline in
general and the study of China’s rise in particular, which is followed
by a survey of some alternative ontological reﬂections from poststruc-
turalist, relational, and emergent perspectives. Second, proposing a ho-
lographic relational ontology, I develop concepts such as holographic
transition in order to shed new light on international relations. Next,
turning to China, I examine how its rise is more than another classic
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example of power transition or straight-line Westernization, but a case
of complex holographic transition. This means that the challenges and
promises commonly associated with China are better understood as
holographic reﬂections of the multiple worlds with which China is inex-
tricably bound up. The ﬁnal section concludes that the holographic on-
tology allows a fresh perspective on how to better understand and deal
with profound global challenges of a holographic nature.
2 The Cartesian/Newtonian ontology in IR
and its discontents
Ontology ‘lies at the beginning of any inquiry’ (Cox, 1996, 144). A par-
ticularly inﬂuential ontology in both natural sciences and social sciences
in the West has been a Cartesian/Newtonian worldview and ontology
(Capra, 1999, 22; McMullin, 2001; Heylighen, Cilliers and Gershenson,
2007). Two characteristics often deﬁne this ontology: ‘the whole is
nothing more than the sum of its parts, and . . . each part is a discrete
phenomenon being isolable from the whole and being a fundamental
constitutive element of the system’ (King, 1994, 52; see also Bousquet
and Curtis, 2011, 45).
This ontological foundation, referred to as ‘substantialism’ in sociol-
ogy (see Emirbayer, 1997), allows both natural and social scientists to
deﬁne their objects of study as intrinsically independent units whose
relations, treated as a derivative phenomenon, are mechanistic and
compositional in nature. IR has not been immune from this ontological
stance (Zanotti, 2013). If anything, the Newtonian ‘geographic division
of the world into mutually exclusive territorial states . . . has served to
deﬁne the ﬁeld of study’ (Agnew, 1995, 379).
With some exceptions (Callahan, 2004; Breslin, 2005; Agnew, 2010;
Pan, 2012; Ling, 2013; Garlick, 2016), mainstream IR theories have to
a large extent dominated the study of China’s rise (Garlick, 2016, 287),
both in the West and China. Despite the heated China debate, what is
seldom questioned is the ontological starting point of China as a sepa-
rate, atomistic entity, be it a rising authoritarian power, a quintessential
Westphalian state, a distinctive civilization, or a civilizational state.
While often such terms are used for analytical convenience, there is no
denying that their unquestioned usage does betray a deep-seated
Cartesian/Newtonian ontological position about China’s being.
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Ontology conditions the way we both conceptualize and practice
power relations in world politics (Stout and Love, 2015, 448–449). In
the China context, the Cartesian/Newtonian ontology helps set the
parameters for understanding what China is, where the China chal-
lenges come from, who is responsible for those challenges, and how
they should be dealt with. For example, both Barrack Obama’s ‘Pivot
to Asia’ policy and Donald Trump’s trade sanctions on ‘Chinese’
imports hinge on the ontological assumption of China as a self-
contained actor who is responsible for the China challenge, hence the
main target of their policies.
Given that ontology is never far removed from IR theory and prac-
tice, there has been growing interest in ontology in IR (Hay, 2011, 461;
Wight, 2006; Odysseos, 2007; Zanotti, 2015). For the purpose of this
article, I focus on some critiques of the dominant Cartesian/Newtonian
ontology in the IR theory literature, which can be grouped into three
broad and sometimes overlapping categories: (i) poststructuralist (dis-
cursive) ontology; (ii) relational ontology; and (iii) emergent ontology.1
The poststructuralist (discursive) ontology is an umbrella term that
encompasses critical constructivist, critical geopolitical, feminist, as
well as poststructuralist reﬂections on ontology. Sharing an anti-
foundationalist position, these perspectives argue that things and phe-
nomena such as regions, states, sovereignty, anarchy, security, interests,
identity, gender, and norms are not objective entities or objects out
there, but socially constituted through language and discursive practice
in (gendered) power relations (Ashley, 1988; Wendt, 1992; Peterson,
1992; Walker, 1993; Agnew, 1994; O´ Tuathail, 1996; Campbell, 1998;
Dalby, 2003). Their contingent being cannot be understood outside of
meaning, interpretation and discourse (Bleiker, 2002, 25). Sometimes
called a discursive ontology (Hansen, 2006, 17), it treats language, sym-
bols, discourse, and intersubjective meaning as ontologically fundamen-
tal (see Klotz and Lynch, 2007, 16).
Whereas poststructuralism emphasizes an ontology of things as dis-
course, a relational ontology focuses on things in relationality. Relational
ontology has a long history in philosophical inquiries such as Martin
1 Patrick T. Jackson (2011) defines three non-positivist ontologies: critical realism, analyti-
cism, and reflexivity. I consider, however, the first two ‘non-positivist’ ontologies to be not
substantially different from the positivist or Cartesian/Newtonian ontology.
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Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being-in-the-world’ (see Odysseos, 2007) and in
sociology (Donati, 2011). Its growing popularity has led to a ‘relational
turn’ in recent critical IR scholarship (Jackson and Nexon, 1999;
Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Shih, 2016). Drawing from relational sociol-
ogy, Jackson and Nexon (1999, 301) suggest that social interaction
should be treated as ‘logically prior to the entities doing the interacting’.
In part to challenge the conventional constructivists’ re-reiﬁcation of
agent and structure as essential, preexisting entities such as in Wendt’s
(pre-quantum) structural constructivism,2 Qin Yaqing turns to tradi-
tional Chinese cultures for a relational ontology of interconnectedness,
without which things, persons, and events would not exist (Qin, 2016,
36; Qin, 2018; Zhao, 2009, 10, 15).
A third type of ontological intervention comes from emergent ontol-
ogy. An important concept in philosophy, emergence refers to the phe-
nomenon of emergent properties existing at the level of ‘an emergent
whole’, but irreducible to the properties of the parts at the sub-level
(Wight, 2006, 110; Heylighen et al., 2007, 120). As a particular itera-
tion of relational ontology (Heylighen et al., 2007, 121), this notion
has begun to gain traction in IR (Wight, 2006; Joseph and Wight,
2010; Kavalski, 2015; Wagner, 2016). The idea of complex systems with
emergent properties challenges Newton’s closed systems (Wight, 2015,
67–68; Heylighen et al., 2007, 121). And yet, some forms of the emer-
gent ontology may be best described as a ‘reformed’ Cartesian/
Newtonian ontology insofar as they lack a social emergent ontology
about the ‘parts’, which remain as parts, ontologically separable from
one another as well as from the emergent whole, unaffected by the lat-
ter except at the level of ‘behavior’ (Heylighen et al., 2007, 122).3 This
largely unidirectional emergent ontology is characteristic, for example,
of Waltz’s structural realism (Waltz, 1979). Employing an emergent on-
tology at the systemic, but not state, level (Wight, 2015, 62–63), Waltz
explains state behavior rather than its ontological connection with the
system. Thus, even as Waltz seeks to rectify unit-level reductionism,
2 For a critique of structuration theorists along this line, see Jackson and Nexon (1999,
p. 295).
3 The systems approach espoused by Morton Kaplan and Karl W. Deutsch in the mid-20th
century emphasized relations among nations, but it similarly treated relations as conse-
quential mostly for state behavior, rather than from an ontological perspective.
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his ‘structural realism’ remains wedded to an individualist, hence
Newtonian, ontology (Ashley, 1984; Wight, 2006, 75). Wendt (2015,
33) addresses this structuralist shortcoming through the notion of
quantum emergence, which argues that ‘agents and structures are both
emergent effects of practices’. In this quantum emergent ontology, the
identity of parts cannot be separated from the whole (Wendt, 2015,
257). Thus, ‘parts and whole are “co-emergent,” rather than only the
latter emerging from an ontologically prior base of the former’ (Wendt,
2015, 257, italics in original).
A main contribution of these alternative ontological stances lies
more in their critical challenges to the dominant Cartesian/Newtonian
ontology than in articulating a clear alternative. In relational sociology,
for instance, beyond ‘a clear belief in the importance and centrality of
relations . . . there is no consensus or coherent research program’
(Eacott, 2018, 32). Poststructuralists such as Lyotard, Derrida, and
Foucault are mostly interested in ‘undermining’ existing ontologies
(Choat, 2010, 130), which has led some to argue that poststructuralists
have yet to elaborate an explicit social ontology of their own (Wight,
2006, 82; Howarth, 2013, 22). While these non-Cartesian/Newtonian
ontological reﬂections all believe that the world exists in relationality, it
remains unclear how exactly relationality exists and in what sense.
Going beyond these important ontological reﬂections, I now explore a
more speciﬁc relational ontology through holographic insights from
both quantum physics and traditional Asian thoughts.
3 The promise of a holographic relational ontology
3.1 What’s in a part? Introducing a holographic relational
ontology
Holography is a Nobel Prize-winning method of producing a type of
three-dimensional image that is called hologram (derived from the
Greek words holo, meaning ‘whole’, and gram, meaning ‘to write’,
Bohm, 1980, 183; see also Pitts, 1995, 294–295). In a hologram, ‘each
part mirrors the whole, such that one could reconstruct the whole from
any of the parts’ (Wendt, 2006, 201). Though the holographic relation-
ship between parts and wholes is not the only type of relationality or
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the only way of conceptualizing it, holography helps shed light on a
speciﬁc yet fundamental facet of relational ontology.
The holographic principle has been conﬁrmed in quantum theory.
The picture of hadrons described by the bootstrap theory, for example,
indicates that ‘every particle consists of all other particles’, though
‘consist’ here cannot be understood ‘in a classical, static sense’ (Capra,
1999, 295–296). In fractal geometry, holographical ontology ﬁnds ex-
pression in ‘self-similarity’ or ‘self-scaling’, a phenomenon of fractal
shapes or patterns repeating themselves at descending scales, ‘so that
their parts, at any scale, are similar in shape to the whole’ (Capra,
1996, 138; see also Bohm and Peat, 1987, 152–156). The fractal holo-
graphic phenomenon, widely observable in plants, mountains, rivers,
coastlines, lightning, blood vessels, and so forth, ‘lies much closer to
the forms of nature than do the circles, triangles, and rectangles of
Greek geometry’ (Bohm and Peat, 1987, 154).
Outside quantum physics, systems theory, and fractal geometry, ho-
lographic ideas have existed in many traditional cultures (Capra, 1996).
In Mahayana Buddhism, cosmic holographic consciousness is conveyed
through the metaphor of Indra’s net. Within this net is ‘a network of
pearls, so arranged that if you look at one you see all the others
reﬂected in it. In the same way, each object in the world is not merely
itself but involves every other object and in fact is everything else’ (Sir
Charles Eliot, quoted in Capra, 1999, 296). In China, there exists a
strong philosophical tradition of systemic and holistic thinking (Liu,
1990, 115–117; Kaptchuk, 1983, 7). According to Mencius (2003, Book
VII, Part A, 145–146), ‘All the ten thousand things are there in me’
and ‘a man [sic] who knows his own nature will know Heaven’, mean-
ing that humanity and heaven are holographically resemblant and
interlinked (tian ren he yi). Meanwhile, traditional Chinese medical
practices such as acupuncture and palmistry are based on similar ideas
that various parts of a body such as ears, feet, and hands mirror the
structure of the whole body (see Liu, 1990, 305–309).
The holographic whole-parts relations differ from the Cartesian/
Newtonian compositional and structural relations of preexisting, au-
tonomous parts. According to the holographic relational ontology,
from the outset a part as a microcosmic whole owes its very existence,
identity, and characteristics to its whole. The ‘inertia of a material ob-
ject’, as physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach, a critic of Newton’s
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theories of space and time, observes, ‘is not an intrinsic property of
matter, but a measure of its interaction with all the rest of the universe’
(quoted in King, 1994, 55). This ontology highlights the holographic
mutual implication and co-emergence between the whole and its parts,
a type of relationality existing between, for example, plants and their
seeds, chicken and egg, and yin and yang (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014,
144; Ling, 2014, 96–97).
That the whole is in its parts is best understood in an informational
sense (considering that the production of holographic photography
involves the movement of information). Perhaps not coincidentally, ho-
lography in Chinese means ‘whole information’ (quanxi). By nature, in-
formation does not belong to or stay in one place; it is to be shared,
communicated, and interrelated. It is through (inﬁnite) informational
interconnectedness across both space and time that ‘our sense experien-
ces, nervous system, and brain are understood as continuous with the
whole of the material world’ (Nichol, 2003, 79). In the social world,
which cannot be reiﬁed as ontologically separate from the natural
world, informational interconnectedness depends especially on lan-
guage, ideas, and discourse.
The implication of information of the whole in its parts is what I
call holographic transition or holographic emergence. Holographic tran-
sition is an ongoing process in which a part, which must have already
been holographically emblematic of its whole(s), continues to reﬂect
and internalize the information of its evolving whole(s), consciously or
unconsciously (more likely both). David Bohm (1980, 251) calls this
process enfolding, whereby ‘information. . . concerning the entire uni-
verse of matter [is fused] into each region of space’. Given that there
exist multiple wholes (or ‘multiverse’, see Ling, 2018) which in turn
contain sub-wholes as well as parts (which themselves are wholes of
still smaller parts, and so on), a part’s holographic transition is neces-
sarily a very complex process and outcome, rather than a linear, ho-
mogenizing and one-off transformation in the image of a particular
part of that whole, such as the West. While China’s holographic transi-
tion certainly involves Westernization, it cannot be reduced to it. For
‘the West’ itself is a holographic part (or more precisely, parts), rather
than a universal whole (Chakrabarty, 2000).
Holographic relations and holographic transition exist in both a spa-
tial and a temporal sense. A part is thus not only a holographic
New relational ontology in global politics 347
representation of its multiple worlds in spatial terms, but also a reﬂec-
tion of its temporal wholes, meaning that it is a product of its tradi-
tional linkages as well as its contemporary spatial entanglements.
Consequently, even within apparently the ‘same’ whole, different parts
necessarily have divergent rather than identical informational and dis-
cursive connections, which may account for inevitable variations and
contingencies in holographic transition in the world.
3.2 International relations as holographic relations:
implications for theorizing and methodology
Until now, despite increasing attention to relationality in the social sci-
ences and emerging interest in quantum theory in IR (Der Derian,
2013; Wendt, 2015), holographic relationality remains understudied
(Milovanovic, 2013, 1). Wendt’s book (2015) brieﬂy examines the state
as a holographic system. But in his own words, that book ‘is all philos-
ophy’, rather than IR (Wendt, 2015, 2). Yet, holographic ontology pro-
vides a new and exciting way of theorizing IR and doing IR research.
As Wendt and Duvall (1989, 55) note, social ontologies ‘have concep-
tual and methodological consequences for how theorists approach
those phenomena they seek to explain’. From the holographic rela-
tional ontology, I draw the following conceptual and methodological
implications for IR in general and for understanding China’s rise in
particular.4 These implications do not amount to a full-ﬂedged theory
on China or IR; rather, they intend to exemplify some broad promises
of ‘quantum theory as an interpretive tool for the social sciences’ (Der
Derian, 2013, 583n7). In this spirit, I hope this can help generate fur-
ther research in this still largely uncharted terrain.
First of all, to the extent that international relations contain parts
(such as states) and wholes (such as international society and the
global economy), their relations are holographic relations. As such,
states (or non-state actors for that matter) are not ﬁxed or essentialist
things with their own intrinsic properties. We can still talk about states
and their characteristics, but to make good sense of them, we need to
4 It must be pointed out that the following methodological implications are meant to be illus-
trative, rather than exhaustive. A holographic relational ontology also underpins the basic
principle of literature reviews in research and such methodological devices as metaphor,
analogy, autoethnography, case study, and survey in the social sciences.
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look at their holographic roots in their wider worlds and understand
how such entanglements enable a state to become ‘the way it is’, not as
an essential being, but always as holographic becoming. All states nec-
essarily emerge from, and contain information of, multiple worlds, and
in this sense, their relations are not merely inter-national relations or
foreign relations. With world politics grounding in a holographic ontol-
ogy, it is possible and indeed imperative to perceive and practice IR in
a more dynamic, holistic, and cooperative way. ‘Foreign policy’ as a
concept, no doubt beﬁtting a Cartesian/Newtonian ontology of self
and Other, may give way to global public policy of empathy and shared
responsibility in dealing with challenges arising from such holographic
relations.
Poststructuralist, postcolonial, and feminist IR literature has usefully
deconstructed the essentialist, binary oppositions of identity/difference,
self/Other, inside/outside, and West/Rest. But the holographic ontology
provides a new perspective on why such dichotomies are fundamentally
untenable given their inevitably common holographic entanglements.
This does not mean that all states are like-units (Waltz, 1979). The
world is not an ideal-type holographic system within which each part
equally shares the same properties of their holographic whole.
Second, insofar as holographic relations in global politics are consti-
tuted largely through informational and discursive connections, dis-
course analysis can help trace the lineage and genealogy of norms and
ideas which make global society hang together. Thus, in a methodologi-
cal sense, the holographic relational ontology has much in common with
the poststructuralist discursive ontology. Yet, while the latter sees things
as constructed by discourse, it says little on the being of discourse itself.
The holographic relational ontology, on the other hand, treats discourse
as existing in as well as constitutive of holographic relations. The holo-
graphic relational existence of discourse, implied in notions such as dis-
cursive formation and intertextuality (Merrell, 1991, 193; Pitts, 1995,
302–303), can explain why discourse cannot be attributed to a single au-
thor and why it (and its associated power effect) appears at once to be
everywhere and nowhere. Thanks to their holographic ontology, dis-
course and power go capillary (Foucault, 1980, 142).
Third, given the existence of holographic relations in both spatial
and temporal terms, understanding a part requires paying attention to
both its holographic relationality in/with the past as well as in the
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present, so as to avoid both ahistorical analysis and historicist deter-
minism. History is not destiny in that we are not bound by ancient ha-
tred or have to mechanically repeat time-honored great power tragedy,
but nor is it something which we can completely transcend (aka the
‘End of History’). We are a holographic part of space and time, our
ontological wholes. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, knew too well his
country’s historically situated holographic ‘identity’:
[T]he history of India is a long history of her relations with the
other countries of Asia. Streams of culture have come to India from
the West and the East and been absorbed in India, producing the
rich and variegated culture which is India today. At the same time,
streams of culture have flowed from India to distant parts of Asia.
If you would know India, you have to go to Afghanistan and West
Asia, to Central Asia, to China and Japan and to the countries of
South-East Asia (Nehru, 2011, 315).
In short, while Cartesian/Newtonian-inspired theorizing favors ‘simpli-
fying’ (Waltz, 1979, 6), holographic ontology highlights a strong quan-
tum characteristic of complexity, uncertainty, and indeterminacy about
global life. Instead of a teleological process of homogenization, holo-
graphic transition is more multifaceted and dynamic. Moreover, schol-
arly discourses are part and parcel of holographic relations in IR, and
rather than merely a neutral analytic tool independent of the world
they describe, they are an inherently participatory factor in how holo-
graphic relations take shape and evolve. Consequently, holographic re-
ality is necessarily protean and complex, and our theorizing effort
ought to reﬂect it accordingly.
4 China’s rise as holographic transition
4.1 China in the world and the world in China
From a Cartesian/Newtonian ontological standpoint, it is easier to un-
derstand what ‘China in the world’ means than to grasp how the world
is also in China. But it is crucial to understand the latter equation
since otherwise we see only a partial picture of China’s ontological
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being. China qua China is always a dynamic constellation of relations,
and the holographic relational ontology affords us a fresh perspective
on the holographic nature of those relations which together constitute
what we see as ‘China’s rise’ today. Indeed, I argue that the rise of
China is a prime example of how China is being transformed through
its ongoing holographic entanglements with the world.
To highlight China’s contemporary rise as holographic transition
does not mean that China was not a holographic being before. Rather,
China’s rise represents a signiﬁcant new phase of it, which has yet to
be more fully examined. In this section, I sketch out a ﬁrst-cut account
of China’s rise in holographic terms. From the beginning, ‘China’ may
be seen as a self-conscious holographic project, modeling itself on tian-
xia (All under Heaven). With that holographic self-imagination, it was
open, for example, to Buddhist inﬂuence from India. Under the rule of
the Mongols, China was introduced to Islamic and Persian medicine. It
is noted that in their study of China, French scholars started to unravel
India and Central Asia (Chandra, 1998), meaning that inside the so-
called ‘China’ there were traces of Indian and Central Asian cultures.
Tu (1994, 4) thus likens ‘Chinese culture’ to ‘a majestic ﬂowing stream’,
arguing that many ‘great outside inﬂuences altered this stream at vari-
ous points’. But the terms ‘stream’ and ‘outside inﬂuences’ still do not
go far enough in conveying the inherently holographic nature of
China’s being/becoming.
In fact, the term China (Zhongguo in Chinese) is largely absent in
traditional Chinese canons. For example, it exists neither in the
Confucian classic text Analects nor the Daoist text Daodejing, whereas
by contrast the word ‘tianxia’ appears 23 and 60 times respectively. As
Rey Chow (1998, 6) points out, the obsession with China and
Chineseness among Chinese intellectuals was largely a product of recent
world history, which itself testiﬁes to China’s modern holographic
emergence in the Eurocentric world of nationhood and nationalism
(see also Zhao, 2005, 8, 13–14).
Given that China has always been a holographic part of its changing
worlds, it is no longer adequate to cast its contemporary rise merely in
terms of change in power balance; it must also be an ongoing process
of holographic transition, emergence, worlding, or enfolding. The exist-
ing literature has made much about a rising China with increasingly
global presence (Shambaugh, 2013; Wortzel, 2013). Yet, the same
New relational ontology in global politics 351
literature continues to treat China in ‘national’ terms (for a critique,
see Pan, 2014). While China’s rise has no doubt cast a large shadow
on the world, its ability to do so is precisely due, at least in part, to its
changes within (Zhang, 1992, 428), many of which reﬂect the effects of
its global connections. That is, China not only has gone global, but
also many elements of ‘the global’ have simultaneously gone inside
‘China’, thus creating a further globalized China (Zweig, 2002; Zhang,
2003; Pan, 2009a; Carlson, 2015). In this ongoing process of mutual
implication between ‘China’ and its multiple worlds, China is never
conﬁned to, or merely deﬁned by, itself. In this sense, Aihwa Ong
(2005, 18) is right that ‘When a book about China is only about
China, it is suspect’. To understand China entails considering its global
holographic relations.
At ﬁrst sight, the notion of China as a holographically global state
ﬂies in the face of its reputation as a stubbornly Westphalian state, im-
pervious to (especially political) change hoped by the West (Mann,
2007). But as noted earlier, holographic transition is never meant to be
mere Westernization. If we look only for rapid change in China mostly
in our own image, we are likely to overlook or downplay China’s open-
ing up to the wider worlds and to their goods, resources, capital, sci-
ence and technology, information, norms, cultures, fashions, crises,
challenges, among other things. Emanating from these extensive rela-
tions is not the intensiﬁcation of two-way transactional ﬂows in trade,
investment, people, and ideas between an otherwise static China and
the rest of the world, but a China that has been simultaneously trans-
formed in the complex images of its multiple worlds. Such holographic
transition, by no means always positive, can be illustrated through the
holographic nature of the ‘Chinese’ economy, the ‘Chinese’ state, and
‘Chinese’ society.
The ‘Chinese’ economy is perhaps China’s holographic transition
par excellence. Since the beginning of China’s open-up policy, the econ-
omy has been gradually transformed into a world economy writ small,
so to speak. In 2016, China’s total imports and exports reached $4.1
trillion, compared to $20.6 billion in 1978. It now ranks as the largest
trading nation in the world, with its trade as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) at 40.7% in 2015 (World Bank, 2016).
According to the United Nations, annual foreign direct investment
(FDI) ﬂows to China grew from $2 billion in 1985 to $128 billion in
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2014 (Morrison, 2015, 14), when China overtook the USA as the top
destination for FDI for the ﬁrst time since 2003 (BBC, 2015). By mid-
2012, 436,800 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) had been set up in
China (Xinhua, 2012). In 2014, FIEs in China accounted for 45.9%
and 46.4% of its exports and its imports, respectively, and their share
in China’s high-tech exports was even higher (Morrison, 2015, 13; see
also Pan, 2009a, 17). What these ﬁgures reveal is not only increased
interdependence between the Chinese economy and the world economy,
but also the deepening transformation of the former as a holographic
part of the expanding global supply chains and production networks
(Pan, 2009a). Ranging from computers to smart phones, many so-
called ‘Made-in-China’ products are in fact made by numerous trans-
national corporations and suppliers. It has become difﬁcult to ‘speak
of. . . China as a single economic unit’, or to attach ‘an accurate na-
tional label’ to ‘the goods and services now produced and traded
around the world’ (Ohmae, 1995, 12–13).
Despite the Chinese leadership’s deliberate avoidance of labelling the
economy as ‘capitalist’, there is no denying that market capitalism is
now part and parcel of it. In the words of Long Yongtu, China’s chief
representative in its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession nego-
tiations, ‘China’s economy must become a market economy in order to
become part of the global economic system’ (quoted in Pan, 2009b,
136). In this process, FIEs and the ideas and norms they represent
have played a key role. Consequently, their presence and penetration in
China has brought not only higher environmental standards, increased
awareness of social corporate responsibility, and modern business man-
agement practices to their Chinese partners, but also inappropriate
worker relations, corrupted practices and anti-competitive behavior
(Enright, 2017).
As the private sectors of the Chinese economy grow, even the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), now welcoming private entrepre-
neurs into its ranks, could not be immune from being holographically
affected. Indeed, the very ideas upon which the CCP was ﬁrst founded
came from Europe. Today, internal CCP reforms continue to be inﬂu-
enced by the multiple worlds, including Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, Central Asia, and a variety of non-communist states in
Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. As a result, ‘the
CCP itself is evolving into an eclectic hybrid, composed of bits and
New relational ontology in global politics 353
pieces of a wide variety of systems’ (Shambaugh, 2008, 296). Similarly,
Wei Pan argues that China’s political regime is a mixed regime which
has drawn upon ‘the Chinese tradition of civil service via examination
and the Western tradition of legalism and liberalism’ as well as ‘the
experiments of Hong Kong and Singapore polities’ (Pan, 2003, 3).
The CCP’s holographic transition mirrors a similar process concern-
ing the change of the Chinese state. As some ‘state transformation’ lit-
erature demonstrates, the Chinese state has been transformed into a
‘regulatory state’ as a result of ‘changes in political-economy relations,
particularly class formation and the political strategies of socio-
political forces’ in a new global environment (Hameiri and Jones, 2016,
78). Yet, as a holographic being, the Chinese state deﬁes any single
labels, for it bears closer resemblance to something of what Michael
Mann (1993, 75–82) describes as ‘polymorphous’. In the words of
Linda Weiss (2012, 38), a polymorphous state is ‘internally a non-
unitary conﬁguration whose various components have crystallised at
different points in time, obeyed different rationales, experienced often
separate histories, and become linked to different constituencies, do-
mestic and international’. Thus, it is not self-contradictory to claim
that China is at once a neoliberal capitalist state, a developmental
state, a competition state, a regulatory state, a mercantilist state, and a
party-state. Its polymorphousness testiﬁes precisely to the holographic
nature of a Chinese state in transition.
Such a holographic transition is both enabled by and reinforces the
transnational ﬂows of people, ideas, and discourses at the societal level.
For instance, between 1978 and 2015, more than 4 million Chinese stu-
dents went overseas to study, and during the same period more than
half of them returned (Ministry of Education, 2016). There were
397,635 international students from 202 countries and regions around
the world studying in China in 2015 (Zhang, 2016). In 2010, at least
600,000 expats were working or living across China (Zhou and Elsinga,
2015). The city of Yiwu, a globally connected small merchandise hub,
is now home to about 10,000 foreign business people from 85 different
countries, working for over 3,000 foreign trading companies (Chen,
2015, 38). It is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the
scales, drivers, structures, processes, and complex mechanisms of such
holographic people-to-people linkages, but sufﬁce it to say that in these
processes have emerged both the ‘transnational capitalist class’ and
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‘transnational public intellectuals’ (Sklair, 2001; Carlson, 2015). Their
interests, ideas, and discourses help weave and sustain the holographic
networks between China and its worlds. Shambaugh and Ren (2012,
37, 39) reveal that almost all major schools of IR theory can ﬁnd
echoes in China. A sociology-of-knowledge analysis of such traveling
theories may well tell a fascinating story of their holographic entangle-
ments. As a result, when we talk about China’s rise, we should not just
focus on its rise in power or capabilities, but also on its holographically
transformed economy, politics, society, and people, as well as their
implications for rethinking China’s IR.
4.2 Realist and liberal theorizing of China revisited
A China that holographically emerges out of the contemporary global-
ized world cannot be adequately understood by theories that are still
based on the Cartesian/Newtonian ontology. In opening up a new on-
tological perspective, this article now turns to a brief examination of
why mainstream IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, need
to be rethought. First, realism, and power transition theory in particu-
lar, have almost completely overlooked China’s contemporary holo-
graphic transition. Analysts from those perspectives continue to see the
rise of a Germany-like great power, but the world in which China has
been rising has largely moved on from the one in which Nazi Germany
emerged. The current international system is more ‘regime-intensive’
than the period during which Europe and the USA came into promi-
nence (Lanteigne 2005, 32). Western theorists may have good reason to
draw upon past European and American experiences to fear China cre-
ating its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ or falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’
(Allison, 2015). What they fail to adequately appreciate is the whole
from which China has emerged is now quite different (Wang, 2013).
The holographic relational perspective does not necessarily mean
that China’s rise or ‘Chinese’ relationality will be peaceful (Shih, 2016,
687). Hard power still matters in contemporary world politics, and re-
alism remains part and parcel of China’s strategic thinking. Hence, de-
spite the existence of a holographic world, if Chinese leaders behave as
if they live in a Cartesian/Newtonian world of mechanistic relations,
then the above-mentioned fears of China may be warranted.
Nonetheless, two points are worth noting here. One is that there is
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some Chinese recognition, at both scholarly and ofﬁcial levels, of the
world as a cosmopolitan whole (e.g., in terms of ‘the community of
common destiny’), and of the notion that there is something of each in
the other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni) (Xi, 2015). Whether
Chinese foreign policy (e.g., Belt and Road Initiative) will live up to
such rhetoric remains to be seen, but at least such understanding seems
to be absent from previous rising powers. Another point is that
China’s holographic relational being is by deﬁnition relational and re-
ciprocal, and thus depends on how other great powers behave toward
China. This is because how its signiﬁcant ‘Others’ behave constitute
part of China’s holographic whole. It would be more difﬁcult for
Beijing to behave differently if other powers continue to adopt a zero-
sum, non-holographic way of understanding and dealing with China.
Second, while liberal scholars do pay close attention to China’s
transformation and socialization (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999;
Johnston, 2008), they also fail to recognize that its transformation/
socialization is fundamentally holographic, rather than linear or uni-
directional. Some liberal thinkers are right that it would be illogical
and extremely difﬁcult for today’s China to overturn the interna-
tional capitalist order (Ikenberry 2008); after all, China is already a
holographic part of that order. Still, many tend to misconstrue
China’s holographic transition as reducible to Westernization or de-
mocratization in Western image (Gilley, 2004; Hutton, 2006; Kristof,
2013), while forgetting that the sources of holographic inﬂuence on
China are global, rather than merely ‘Western’. The global whole in
which China exists and evolves includes also the ‘non-Western’ world
as well as ‘Chinese’ history and tradition, and to ignore those con-
nections and their complex impact on China is to miss a signiﬁcant
aspect of China’s holographic relations in the world.
Furthermore, even as China has absorbed many ‘Western’ inﬂuences
(bearing in mind that there is nothing pure Western to begin with, as
Hobson [2004] points out), such outside inﬂuences, once transmitted
into China, may undertake further local holographic transition of their
own by taking on some ‘Chinese’ characteristics (Pan, 2012, 116–117).
Also, as China’s power grows and its relations further expand (such as
through the Belt and Road Initiative), it is certain to once again be-
come a major source of holographic transition for other countries, just
as it once was, particularly through its tributary system, in which the
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participation of the ‘barbarians’ was in part to ‘come and be trans-
formed’ (lai-hua) (Fairbank, 1942, 132). Thus, China’s rise is both an
object and an agent of holographic transition. For this reason, it can-
not be understood as a simple return to a Sinocentric world order or a
Chinese world without the West (Katzenstein, 2012; Barma, Ratner
and Weber, 2007). After all, what is ‘Chinese’ is always already and
will continue to be a holographic reﬂection of its wider worlds, includ-
ing the West.
To sum up, both the ‘identity’ of China and its implications for the
world are inherently complex, dynamic and indeterminate. They do not
ﬁt neatly with the realist or liberal grand theorizing of China’s rise as
either revisionist or conformist. As holographic transition, China’s rise
deﬁes such binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the
Western-dominant order or a linear integration into it. With China un-
able to meet the liberal expectation, there has now been growing disil-
lusionment with, and renewed realist fear of it in recent years (Pan,
2012, Chapter 7; Campbell and Ratner, 2018). Without doubt, China’s
rise does pose many profound challenges, whether economically, politi-
cally, normatively, or environmentally. But such challenges, despite
their apparent ‘Chinese’ symptoms, often have their holographic ori-
gins in the worlds. Thus, without denying Chinese responsibility or
agency, to effectively deal with those challenges requires us to see them
less as uniquely Chinese problems than as global and holographic chal-
lenges. Global problems demand global public policy and cooperative
solutions. As such, for the Trump administration to focus on ‘Chinese’
imports, for instance, as the cause of the USA’s job-loss problem
misses the point. Similarly, any attempts to contain China are unlikely
to be effective given that China’s very being has been embodied and
embedded in holographic relations with the global whole, with which
we are all inextricably entangled and implicated.
5 Conclusion
The basic starting point of this article is that the obstacle to better un-
derstanding China’s rise is not primarily theoretical or empirical, but
ontological. Speciﬁcally, mainstream IR theories, informed by the
Cartesian/Newtonian ontology, continue to see China’s rise as the rise
of another self-contained actor, with its own identity, power, challenges,
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and/or opportunities. Questioning this ontological framework, this arti-
cle has proposed a holographic relational ontology. From this perspec-
tive, China’s rise is not only a matter of power transition, but also a
process of holographic transition into the multiple worlds, economi-
cally, politically and socially. As a consequence, the various challenges
associated with its rise are best understood and dealt with from a holo-
graphic standpoint.
This ontological rethinking calls into question both the realist and
liberal theorizing of China’s rise.5 Focusing almost exclusively on the
implications of China’s rising power, the former fails to take into ac-
count its holographic transition in the contemporary world. The latter,
on the other hand, sees China’s rise either as a more or less linear and
teleological process of ‘Westernization’, or no political change at all.
Both fail to come to terms with the complexities and indeterminacies
of China’s holographic re-emergence. This article does not claim to of-
fer a new theory of understanding China’s IR. Instead, it has gestured
toward an alternative approach that goes beyond the Cartesian/
Newtonian ontology. As such, if it has not presented a clear alternative
picture of China that can be easily understood in conventional
Cartesian/Newtonian terms, that is because China’s holographic entan-
glements do not lend itself to such a caricature.
Beyond China, the implication is that the world is not a grand
chessboard, with countries as single self-bounded chess-pieces vying
for power in a zero-sum game. Rather, it resembles a boundless
holographic web, with each part of the web in one way or another mir-
roring the complex whole. As global challenges loom, transnational
interconnectedness deepens, and a myriad of issues interact in unpre-
dictable ways, it is now time to take the worlds’ holographic existence
more seriously.
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